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Chapter 4 
Risky Debt-Maturity Choice Under 
Information Asymmetry 
Sheen Liu 
Youngstown State University, USA 
Chunchi Wu* 
Singapore Management University, Singapore and 
Syracuse University, USA 
The traditional equilibrium models of signaling with debt-maturity require transaction costs 
by firms when raising new capital. In this paper, we propose a new model that has no such 
requirement. We demonstrate that a separating equilibrium of debt-maturity choice exists under 
a much more general condition, once accounting for the interactions between borrowers and 
lenders. The model is able to explain the observed complex financial structure. It is found 
that callable debt functions much like short-term debt, and serial debt similar to long-term 
debt. In equilibrium, high-quality firms issue short-term debt, and low-quality firms issue 
long-term debt. 
Keywords: Bond maturity; information asymmetry; signaling; sequential games. 
1. Introduction 
Under information asymmetry, firm insiders with better information than out-
side investors will choose to issue those securities the market appears to value 
most. Knowing this, rational investors will try to infer insider information 
from firms' financing strategies. Signaling theory contends that under certain 
conditions firms' choice of risky debt-maturity can convey the insider informa-
tion about firm quality.1 Plausible signaling equilibria often require transaction 
costs by firms when raising capital (see, e.g., Bhattacharya, 1979; Flannery, 
1986). In particular, for firms to signal their true quality to the market effec-
tively, transaction costs of issuing or retiring debts must be high enough to 
deter low-quality firms from mimicking high-quality firms.2 Conversely, when 
•"Corresponding author. 
See Ravid (1996) for a review of debt-maturity signaling literature. 
2See Flannery (1986) and Wu (1993). 
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financial market transactions are costless and changes in firm value are inde-
pendent over time, firms' debt-maturity structure may fail to provide a credible 
signal. Kale and Noe (1990) examine the decision of debt-maturity choice 
using precise equilibrium refinements. They demonstrate that in the absence 
of transaction costs, there is no separating Nash sequential equilibrium since 
low-quality firms always have an incentive to mimic high-quality firms. Under 
this condition, both short- and long-term debt poolings are Nash sequential 
equilibrium outcomes, but only the short-term debt pooling equilibrium is uni-
versally divine.3 On the other hand, a separating equilibrium exists if there 
are transaction costs and investment outcomes are correlated. Diamond (1991, 
1993) shows that liquidity risk may force low-quality firms to use short-term 
debt, leaving only intermediate-quality firms to issue long-term debt.4 Using 
a different approach, Titman (1992) shows that a separating debt-market equi-
librium can be obtained if swap agreements are allowed to resolve the problem 
of interest rate uncertainty. 
The requirement of transaction costs for a separating equilibrium may be 
due to the underlying assumptions in signaling models, some of which are 
arguably refutable. For example, previous studies often contend that without 
transaction costs, there is only one plausible outcome for firms' debt-maturity 
choice (M): both "Good" (G) and "Bad" (B) firms choose to issue short-term 
debt, M = {S, S}. A critical assumption behind these models is that investors 
will price risky debt at the average quality of firms where the distribution of 
quality is prior knowledge. This assumption results in a pooling equilibrium 
in which the value of Bad firms increases at the expense of Good firms (see 
Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Ross, 1977; Campbell and Kracaw, 1980). The 
separating equilibrium is not forthcoming because Bad firms can always mimic 
Good firms in the absence of transaction costs. 
However, the outcome of pooling may not be incentive-compatible. It is 
not necessarily costless for Bad firms to mimic Good firms. When the time 
comes for Bad firms to refinance their debt, they will more likely be in a worse 
Note that when the assumption of independent changes in firm value is relaxed, Kale and Noe 
(1990) demonstrate that a separating equilibrium may exist, in which high-quality firms issue 
short-term debt and low-quality firms issue long-term debt. 
4
 Diamond (1991) does not explicitly assume transaction costs. In his model, forced liquidation 
results in a loss of management's control rent. In a sense, lost control rent is an opportunity 
cost of signaling. It can be shown that an absence of the control rent would result in a pooling 
equilibrium. Guedes and Opler (1996) and Stohs and Mauer (1996) find results consistent with 
Diamond's predictions. 
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state and to pay a much higher premium to refinance short-term debt. Bad firms 
ought to consider this consequence when deciding whether they should mimic 
Good firms. Even without transaction costs, mimicking may not be the best 
strategy for Bad firms because they may be penalized upon refinancing their 
short debt.5 
A simple example may help illustrate this point. Two applicants apply for 
the same job, and the employer offers two contracts, short- and long-term. 
The short-term contract offers a higher annual salary than does the long-term 
contract, and there are no other costs for renewing the contracts. Knowing her 
own productivity, the "Good" applicant does not worry about the renewal of her 
contract and so prefers the short-term contract. Although the "Bad" applicant 
can also get a higher salary by signing the short-term contract, she knows that 
she may not be able to renew her contract after it expires. Thus, mimicking 
the "Good" applicant is not costless. If the cost of mimicking is greater than 
the gain from the higher salary of the short-term contract, the "Bad" applicant 
will prefer the long-term contract. If the employer can somehow design the 
contract optimally to allow each candidate to differentiate herself, a separating 
equilibrium can arise. 
One serious drawback of traditional debt-maturity models is that they 
assume investors are not actively involved in the signaling game. A direct con-
sequence is that the pricing mechanism of debts is exogenously given, instead 
of being endogenously derived from investors' rational choices. In this setting, 
investors wait passively for the outcome of the game between Good and Bad 
firms. If both firms choose to issue short-term debt, investors will price this debt 
at the average quality of firms, resulting in a pooling equilibrium. Conversely, if 
Good firms borrow short and Bad firms borrow long, investors will price short 
debt at the quality of Good firms and long debt at the quality of Bad firms, 
resulting in a separate equilibrium. Either the pooling or the separating equi-
librium is the outcome of the game solely between Good and Bad firms, and 
investors cannot influence their financing strategy. For example, Good firms 
will choose to issue short-term debt only if the added refinancing cost of a 
rollover strategy is smaller than their misinformation value in the pooling equi-
librium. A separating equilibrium can occur when at the same time the gain that 
Bad firms achieve from issuing short-term debt is less than the flotation cost 
•'The recent events of Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom are excellent examples of how market 
discipline is enforced. After investors discover that truthful information was not disclosed, 
these firms can no longer have normal access to debt-markets. 
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incurred. When these conditions are not met, both firms will issue the same debt 
and a pooling equilibrium occurs. Firms optimally (or suboptimally) choose 
a debt-maturity structure based on market conditions, and investors play little 
role in this process. 
The assumption that investors are inactive is rather unrealistic. In reality, 
investors (particularly institutional investors) in the debt-market often interact 
with the issuers or investment bankers to come to an agreement with the terms 
of debts. Market equilibrium is typically an outcome of interactions between 
suppliers and demanders. Investors can change their pricing strategy to affect 
the firm's debt choice and ultimately alter the equilibrium outcome. Like the 
aforementioned example of labor contracts, investors may set different terms 
for borrowers so that they will reveal their true credit quality. 
In this paper, we propose an alternative model of debt-maturity choice that 
accounts for the interactions between borrowers and lenders. In this model, 
both firms and investors play an important role in the determination of a debt-
market equilibrium. Good firms have an incentive to differentiate themselves 
from Bad firms to reduce their debt financing costs. Investors have an incentive 
to identify Bad firms to reduce their investment risk associated with adverse 
selection. Good firms use different debt instruments to signal their credit quality 
to the market. Investors actively search for an optimal pricing scheme to induce 
firms to differentiate among themselves by choosing different debt instruments. 
Including investors as active strategic players in the game produces an equi-
librium outcome dramatically different from previous ones. We show that a 
separating equilibrium of debts with different maturities exists under a much 
more general condition. In particular, flotation costs are no longer required for 
the existence of a separating equilibrium. 
The model is capable of explaining the complicated debt structure observed 
in the financial world. It is found that bond covenants are useful for resolving 
the problem of asymmetric information. For example, the call provision can 
reduce the misinformation value (dead-weight cost) or the cost of signaling in 
achieving the informational equilibrium. Similarly, the sinking-fund provision 
conveys the quality of the bond issuers. The sinking-fund call feature is shown 
to reinforce the effect of the amortization scheme in resolving the problem of 
asymmetric information faced by the issuers. In contrast, serial debt with no 
sinking-fund calls behaves much like long-term debt. Thus, bond covenants 
may either enhance the maturity effect or simply serve a function similar to 
debt-maturity in corporate financing decisions. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents 
a pricing model of debts with asymmetric information. Section 3 discusses 
investors' pricing strategies and derives the equilibrium of a sequential game 
including the investor as a player. Section 4 provides numerical examples to 
illustrate the separating equilibrium with and without flotation costs. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. The Model 
This section sets up a valuation model of long- and short-term bonds under 
information asymmetry. The key assumptions underlying this model are sum-
marized as follows: 
(A.l) There are two periods in the model. Each firm invests in a single project 
at the beginning of period 1, to. The project is liquidated at the end 
of period 2, ti, and the distribution of its liquidation value is com-
mon knowledge. The liquidation values are Afj, MA,, and Ms, where 
M3 > M4 > M5. The probabilities of reaching different states and final 
liquidation values are displayed in Figure 1.6 The firm does not default 
at any state except S5. At state 55, M5 is zero; that is, there is no residual 
value, or the recovery rate of the debt is zero upon default.7 At to, the 
firm must borrow an exogenous amount of debt D to finance the project, 
which generates no cash flow before its liquidation at h-
S3:M3 
S4:M4 
S5:M5 
lo 'i h 
Figure 1. The two-period binomial tree of the firm's project. 
°The setup of this probability structure is similar to Flannery (1986). 
7To simplify the problem, M5 = 0 is assumed. This assumption can be easily relaxed to consider 
the seniority of debts. 
80 Sheen Liu & Chunchi Wu 
(A.2) Two types of debt instruments are considered for financing the project: 
long-term and short-term debts. Long-term debt lasts for two-periods, 
whereas short-term debt lasts only for one-period. 
(A.3) When a short debt is retired at the end of the first period, t\, it is refinanced 
with another short debt maturing at ti. We refer to the combination of 
two short debts as the "short-term" financing strategy and the issuance 
of long debt as the "long-term" strategy. 
(A.4) In the discrete case, we assume two types of firms: "Good" firms have 
projects with an "up" probability p = po, and "Bad" firms have projects 
with p = PB < PG- Investors know the fact that 8 percent of firms 
(projects) are "Good," but they cannot identify a particular firm's qual-
ity. In the continuous case, the true "up" probability, p, for each firm is 
unobservable and distributed on p g L = (0, 1), according to a strictly 
increasing function f(p) e C°°. We use the discrete case to illustrate the 
fundamental principle of choice between long and short debts. The dis-
crete case is then extended to a continuous distribution of credit quality 
to generalize the results to multiple debt instrument choice. 
(A.5) There is information asymmetry in the sense that the management's 
information set is different from outside investors'. Consequently, the 
management's perception of the "up" probability (n = p) differs from 
investors' (n = it). Investors have homogeneous expectations and adopt 
the same rule of valuation on risky claims. 
(A.6) Firm managers and investors are risk-neutral, expected wealth 
maximizers. 
Given the estimate of "up" probability, n, risk-neutral investors require an 
interest factor (one plus the coupon rate) on the long-term debt issued at to, R^, 
such that the expected payoff on risky debt equals the principal amount lent: 
F = TIFRI + (\-TT)TTFRI. (1) 
This equality yields an interest factor for the long-term debt 
The risk-neutral manager's valuation of equity when pursuing a long-term 
borrowing strategy is 
VL = p{plM3 - R£F\ + (1 - p)[M4 - R£F}} + (1 - p)p[M4 - R£F\. 
(3) 
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Substituting Equations (2) into (3) and rearranging yields 
VL = V1 + VLmis (4) 
where the firm's value is composed of an intrinsic value 
Vi = p2M3 + 2p(l - p)M4 - F (5) 
and a misinformation value 
vr = F
2<«-rt + &-*2\
 (6) 
2TT — nl 
which is caused by asymmetric information. The misinformation value is rep-
resented by the difference between the value viewed by the outside investor 
(reflected in his n estimate) and its fair value based on the insider's information 
(for p). 
The firm issuing short-term debt retires it at t\. By (A.l), no default occurs 
at t\ and so the entire principal F is retired (the coupon rate is zero) and the 
same amount of short debt is reissued. At state S\, investors require an interest 
factor (/?" |5i) for short debt. Similarly, at state 52, given investors' estimate of 
"up" probability U = n, investors require an interest factor (R* IS2) for short 
debt. Thus, for the short debt issued at to, risk-neutral investors will require 
one-period interest factors such that 
F =
 JrF(Rl\S1) + (l-7r)Fji(R*l\S2) (7) 
Lemma 1 establishes the values of the short-term interest factors (/Jf^S,-), 
i = 1, 2 at different states. 
Lemma 1 
The short-term interest factor for refinancing at t\ is given by 
( ^ 1 5 0 = 1, (/^|S2) = - . (8) 
JT 
Proof. At state 5i, F amount of short debt is retired, and the same amount of 
short debt is re-issued. At this state, investors know that short debt is default-
free, and thus, they charge an interest factor (iff1!Si) = 1. At state S2, given 
the estimate of "up" probability n , investors know that short debt has a default 
probability of 1 — n and a recovery rate of zero. Thus, they require an interest 
factor 
(fl?|S2) = - . (9) 
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Alternatively, using (.ft" ISO = 1 and Equation (7), we have 
F = TZF + (1 - TZ)TTF{R*\S2) 
by which we can solve for the one-period interest factor at state S2 
(R*\S2) = -
TV 
Note that we made no assumption before that investors know the true prob-
ability of the "up" state for each firm's project. The values of the interest factors 
in Equations (2) and (9) depend on investors' estimate of the "up" probability n. 
Setting n = it, we can obtain the interest factors required by investors for both 
short and long debts. For ease of notation, we henceforth replace (/?" | S\) with 
one, and (7?fT|52) with /?". 
The risk-neutral manager's valuation of equity under the short-term debt 
financing strategy is 
Vs = p{p[M3 - F] + (1 - p)[M4 - F]} + (1 - p)pLM4 - FtffJ. (10) 
Substituting Equation (9), with R J1 evaluated at n = n, into Equation (10) 
and rearranging, we have 
Vs = Vi + V™s, V^is = F(l-p)7^-^. (11) 
it 
Previous studies (see, e.g., Flannery, 1986; Kale and Noe, 1990; Diamond, 
1991) have implicitly assumed that investors take a passive role in the deter-
mination of the signaling equilibrium. We denote the pricing strategy when 
investors are inactive as pricing strategy A. Under this pricing strategy, the 
values of the "up" probability are determined according to firms' debt-maturity 
choices (M): 
1. If M — {L, S] or M = [S, L], then 7rs = pc and 7tL = PB-8 
2. If M = {L, L} or M — {S, S}, then 7rs or JTL is chosen so that 
E Vr*(q) = 0, 
where i = S (short debt), L (long debt), and q = G (good firm), B (bad firm). 
In the first case, Good and Bad firms choose different financing strategies, 
and so the probability of the "up" state is assigned according to the quality of 
each firm. In the second case, Good and Bad firms choose the same financing 
8Previous studies (Flannery, 1986; Kale andNoe, 1990; Diamond, 1990) show that M = {L, S] 
is not a viable separating equilibrium. 
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strategy. Since it is not possible to distinguish Good from Bad firms through 
their financing patterns, an average price is charged to all bonds such that the 
aggregate misinformation value is equal to zero. On the sell side of the market, 
Bad firms gain and Good firms lose. On the buy side, those who invest in Bad 
firms' bonds pay an excessive price. 
There are two potential difficulties with this pricing strategy commonly 
adopted in the existing debt-maturity literature: First, the pricing strategy pre-
sumes that investors will accept whatever pricing rules that are given. However, 
if investors are rational, they should be able to choose a pricing rule that bet-
ter serves their interests. Second, it assumes no investor learning. In reality, 
investors may receive a signal, m e M, conveyed by firms or information 
agencies. They may then estimate n based on m and price the debts either 
under the separating equilibrium or under the pooling equilibrium. In either 
case, investors' pricing strategy would be based on their best assessment of n, 
rather than on a passive reaction to firms' debt choice or an exogenously given 
pricing rule. The pricing strategy chosen by investors should directly affect the 
firm's choice of debt or alternatively, the firm's financing decision should take 
into account the expected pricing strategy of the investors. In the following 
section, we discuss an alternative pricing strategy and a sequential game in 
which investors' pricing strategy is explicitly accounted for. 
3. Debt-Market Equilibrium 
Under information asymmetry, investors are uncertain about the quality of 
Good and Bad firms. This uncertainty could cause a mispricing of bonds with 
investors paying an excessive price for low-quality bonds. It is therefore in their 
interest to try to distinguish Good from Bad firms. For example, investors can 
offer different prices to the bonds issued by firms by assigning different values 
of 7rL and jts based on their best judgment. Given the values of TT^ and its, 
the firm will compare its equity values under different financing strategies. If 
VL > Vs, it will issue long-term debt; otherwise, it will issue short-term debt. 
Thus, the criterion for the firm's financing decision is the value difference: 
AV = VL- Vs + c 
(l-p)(2-7TL)nL + (2-p~(2-7TL)7tL)7tS 
= P ~ ; +c, (12) 
(2 — 7TL)71LTCS 
where the flotation cost c is included. If the difference in Equation (12) is greater 
than zero, the firm chooses to issue long debt; otherwise, it issues short debt. 
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If investors could somehow find a combination of 7TL and its SO that Good 
and Bad firms choose to issue different debts, they would be able to discern 
the firm type and to price the debt more efficiently. Although investors may not 
know exactly the initial quality of each firm, they could assign a plausible set of 
jt values to the debts issued by firms and observe their response. The response 
of Good and Bad firms to investors' TT estimates, or their choice of long or short 
debt, sends a signal back to investors. Investors refine their estimate for the firm 
quality based on the feedback signal they receive. They would then change their 
offer based on their revised probability estimates and observe firms' response 
in the next round. This learning and adjustment process may continue until 
precise estimates of TX are obtained and a market equilibrium is achieved. We 
define this strategy of actively searching for a better price or a better estimate of 
n (firm quality) as pricing strategy B. We will show that, under pricing strategy 
B, an optimal combination of JI^ and TTS exists even under zero flotation costs 
such that the separating equilibrium is always achievable. 
3.1. A separating equilibrium without flotation costs 
We first examine the case with c = 0, which represents a debt-market with 
zero flotation costs. It can be shown that a separating equilibrium of the debt-
market exists in the absence of flotation costs. We summarize the equilibrium 
condition as follows. 
Proposition 1 
A separating equilibrium of the debt-market exists if 7TL and its satisfy the 
condition that 
(2 - 7TL)^L , , , , , 
0 < 7TL < 7TS < — . (13) 
2 - (2 - 7TL)^ L 
Firms with a quality p < p* prefer long-term debt, whereas firms with a quality 
p > p* prefer short-term debt. Firms with a quality p — p* are indifferent to 
long- and short-term debts. The value of the cutoff quality p* is given by 
(2 - 7th)nh - jrs[2 - (2 - JtL)jtL] 
(2 — Ji]_)nL — its 
(14) 
Proof. See Appendix A. 
The inequality in Equation (13) establishes the necessary condition for a 
separating equilibrium. The sufficient condition further requires that pB < P* 
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Figure 2. Changes in A V with quality p under zero c. 
and PQ > p* where pt,i = B, G are the true probability of the "up" state for 
Bad and Good firms, respectively. Figure 2 gives a graphical presentation of 
the above results. Assuming that p = 0, from Equation (12) we have AV — 0 
given c = 0. But for a separating equilibrium, there must exist a positive p* 
that makes AV = 0. Curve A in Figure 2 shows one possible path for this 
condition to be held where the value of the criterion function goes up and then 
goes down to cross the horizontal axis. Firms prefer long debt when p < p* but 
prefer short debt when p > p*. On the contrary, the path depicted by curve B 
does not cross the horizontal axis, and so no separating equilibrium exists in 
this case. 
Curve A has a positive slope at p = 0 and a concave curvature so that the 
curve crosses AV = 0 line at a strictly positive p. The comparative statistics 
of Equation (12) show that when c — 0, 
3AV 
dp 
(1 + TVs) (2 - 7TL)7TL - 2JTS 
p=0 
82AV 
= - 2 
7Ts(2 — 7TL)7rL 
(2 — 7TL)JTL — 7TS 
dp2 7TS(2 - 7VL)JTL 
It is straightforward to show that if 
dAV 
dp 
> 0 , 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
p=0 
then the second-order derivative must be negative 
32AV 
dp2 
< 0 . (18) 
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Using Equation (15), the condition in Equation (17) can be explicitly 
expressed as: 
7TS < 
(2 - JTL)7TL 
2 - (2 - 7TL)^L ' 
(17a) 
Combining Equations (17a) with (A.5) in Appendix A and noting that 
TTL > 0, we can easily obtain the necessary condition in Equation (13). Thus, 
Equation (17) is a critical condition for a separating equilibrium. Curve B in 
Figure 2 has a negative value for both the first and second derivatives. Because 
the condition in Equation (13) is violated, there is no separating equilibrium. As 
shown, curve B does not cross the horizontal axis (A V = 0) at any positive p. 
Figure 3 gives a graphical representation of the necessary condition for the 
separating equilibrium. The horizontal axis measures the "up" probability of 
long-term debt TTL and the vertical axis measures that of short-term debt TTS . The 
dotted line represents TTL = 7rs, and the upper left triangular region consists of 
^L < TTS- The solid curve represents the boundary for Equation (17) and the 
dashed curve that for Equation (18). The region to the right of the solid curve 
satisfies the condition in Equation (17), while the region to the right of the 
dashed curve satisfies the condition in Equation (18). Hence, the region between 
the solid line and the dotted line indicates where the separating equilibrium 
exists under the condition of no flotation costs. 
0.2 0.4 0.6 O.i 
Up probability of long-term debt 
Figure 3. The separating equilibrium region for n^ and n§. 
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3.2. A separating equilibrium with flotation costs 
We next consider the case with flotation costs. Previous studies have often 
relied on a restrictive flotation cost structure to derive a signaling equilibrium. 
We show that a separating equilibrium always exists in the presence of flotation 
costs, but this equilibrium is a special case of the more general equilibrium that 
includes zero floatation costs. 
Proposition 2 
If c > 0, and 7TL and JTS satisfy the condition that 
0 < 7TL < 7tS < (2 - 7rL)7TL, (19) 
then a separating equilibrium exists. Firms with a quality p < p* prefer the 
long debt, whereas firms with a quality p > p* prefer the short debt. Firms 
with a quality p = p* are indifferent to long and short debts. The value of the 
cutoff quality p* is given by 
* _ (2 - 7TL)^L ~ TTst2 ~ (2 - 7lL)7tl,] 
2[(2 - 7tL)7tL - JTS] 
Vt^sC2 - (2 - 7rL)7TL) - (2 - nL)jTL]2 + 4c7TS(2 - nL)nL[{2 - nL)icL - ns] 
2[(2 - nL)nL - JTS] 
(20) 
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Figure 4 shows possible functions of A V with respect to p for the cases 
with (Curve B) and without flotation costs (Curve A). For a positive flotation 
cost, c > 0, AV is simply shifted up in parallel to the zero c curve (Curve A). 
Because Curve A has a negative first-order derivative of A V with respect to p, 
AV 
c 
0 
Figure 4. A shift in AV given a positive c. 
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(dAV/dp)\p=o < 0, and a negative second-order derivative, (d2AV/dp2) < 0, 
it does not cross the horizontal axis. However, with a positive value of c, 
AV does cross the horizontal axis (see Curve B), since (d2AV/dp2) < 0. 
Therefore, for c > 0, the condition for the first-order derivative in Equation (17) 
is no longer required. Combining (32 AV/dp2) < 0, (A.l 1) in Appendix A, and 
7TL > 0, we obtain the condition in Equation (19). As a result, the separating 
equilibrium region in Figure 3 is expanded since a positive first-order derivative 
is no longer required. The separating equilibrium region is now located between 
the dashed curve and the dotted line. Curve A in Figure 4 is drawn purposely to 
be similar to Curve B in Figure 2. It is shown that for some cases not having a 
separating equilibrium when flotation costs are zero, a separating equilibrium 
can be achieved when flotation costs become positive. Thus, the flotation cost 
differential between long and short debt strategies makes it easier to reach a 
separating equilibrium. 
3.3. Comparison of pricing strategies A and B 
When investors' pricing strategies are taken into consideration, the original 
game (under pricing strategy A) must be augmented to include investors as 
an additional player. The setting of the extended game incorporating investors' 
strategic behavior is shown in Figure 5. This game includes two reduced games: 
one is under pricing strategy A, and the other is under pricing strategy B. 
Previous studies (e.g., Flannery, 1986; Diamond, 1991; Kale and Noe, 1990) 
Investors 
Pricing 
strategy A 
Pricing 
strategy B 
{S,S} (S,L) (L,S) (L,L) {S,S {L,S} {L.L} 
Figure 5. The game involving active investors. 
Risky Debt-Maturity Choice 89 
consider only the first reduced game, in which pricing strategy A is the only 
possibility and investors are passive. The outcome of the first reduced game 
is either a pooling equilibrium or a separating equilibrium depending on the 
nature of the flotation cost function. 
The second reduced game assumes that investors adopt pricing strategy B 
and interact with firms to determine equilibrium bond prices. Since investors 
know the distribution of firm quality, 0, they can select proper probability esti-
mates satisfying 7rs > n^, and search a p* value such that PG > P* > PB-
Under this pricing strategy, the sufficient condition of the separating equilib-
rium is satisfied. Good firms borrow short, whereas Bad firms borrow long, and 
both firms are better off than in any other choices given investors' estimates of 
7Ts and 7TL- Thus, this financing strategy is unequivocally the optimal choice 
for both types of firms. To resolve the adverse selection problem, investors 
minimize the total absolute misinformation value, 
yrais = | V m i s ( G ) | + | y m i s ( g ) | _ ( 2 1 ) 
It can be easily shown that the total absolute misinformation value is always 
smaller under strategy B than under strategy A. 
Corollary 1 
Under pricing strategy B, there will be a separating equilibrium, in which Good 
firms borrow short, while Bad firms borrow long. 
This result does not depend on the magnitude of flotation cost. If the flotation 
cost satisfies the condition that V™1S(G) < — cand V™S(B) < c, the two pricing 
strategies, A and B, lead to the same separating equilibrium. If the flotation cost 
is not high enough to satisfy this condition, these two pricing strategies lead 
to different equilibria. Pricing strategy A leads to a pooling equilibrium in 
short debt, whereas pricing strategy B still leads to a separating equilibrium. 
Investors' best interest is to minimize the total absolute misinformation value 
of the debt-market. Since pricing strategy B leads to a lower total absolute 
misinformation value than does pricing strategy A, it is preferred by investors. 
Comparing these two cases, we conclude that pricing strategy B dominates 
pricing strategy A. 
Corollary 2 
Investors always prefer pricing strategy B to strategy A. There is a separating 
equilibrium under pricing strategy B regardless of flotation costs. 
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4. Numerical Examples 
In this section, we provide numerical examples to explain the intuition behind 
the model. Good and Bad firms' decisions to issue long versus short debt 
depend on the cost of each debt, which is in turn conditional on TTL and TTS set 
by investors. At the beginning of the game, investors do not know the exact 
value of pc and pB for each firm, but they possess a knowledge of the proportion 
of Good (0) and Bad (1 - 0) firms and the average quality of firms, pavg. At 
any stage of the game, investors will always balance their estimates of TTS and 
TTL such that their combination equals the average quality of firms: 
/?avg = 0JTS + (1 - 9)ltL. (22) 
Hence, when investors raise the estimate for TTS, they must lower the estimate 
for 7TL, given that pavg is known. 
Table 1 provides a numerical example for the adjustment process. Here, 
we assume that pG = 0.97, pB = 0.93, and 6 = 0.5. This gives an average 
"up" probability pavg = 0.95. Since initially investors do not know the exact 
"up" probability of each firm, they may try to price long and short debts based 
on the average probability TVL = jts = pw% = p* — 0.95, and observe the 
response of each firm. As shown in line one of Table 1, at these values of 
7TL and 7Ts, long debt yields a higher firm value for Bad firms than short debt 
does (A V# = 0.093), while short debt provides a higher value for Good firms 
(AVG = —0.097). Thus, Bad firms would prefer long debt, and Good firms 
would prefer short debt. The response of each type of firm tells investors that 
PQ > 0.95 and PB < 0.95, and accordingly, they would reduce TT^ and increase 
JTS- Investors may eventually reduce TTL to 0.944 and increase TTS to 0.956, and 
Table 1. Numerical Example 1 (c = 0, PQ = 0.97, PB = 0.93, and 
6 = 0.5). 
*L 
0.9500 
0.9490 
0.9480 
0.9470 
0.9460 
0.9450 
0.9440 
S^ 
0.9500 
0.9510 
0.9520 
0.9530 
0.9540 
0.9550 
0.9560 
P* 
0.9500 
0.9466 
0.9431 
0.9394 
0.9354 
0.9311 
0.9266 
AVB 
0.093 
0.076 
0.058 
0.041 
0.023 
0.005 
-0.013 
AVC 
-0.097 
-0.111 
-0.124 
-0.138 
-0.152 
-0.166 
-0.180 
ymis 
0.152 
0.145 
0.138 
0.131 
0.125 
0.118 
0.110 
Note: p* is calculated from Equation (14), AV from Equation (12), and 
Vmis from Equation (21). 
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discover that both firms no longer choose different debts but instead both prefer 
short debt. This outcome convinces investors that the best they can do is to set 
7rL = 0.945 and TVs = 0.955 to keep Bad firms from mimicking Good firms. 
The aforementioned example assumes zero flotation costs, c = 0. Although 
there are no flotation costs to prevent Bad firms from mimicking Good firms, 
the resulting misinformation value serves for this function. The misinformation 
value in this separating equilibrium is less than that in the pooling equilibrium 
under pricing strategy A, which is represented in line one of Table 1. It is in 
investors' interests to prevent the pooling equilibrium from occurring. Investors 
minimize the sum of misinformation values by choosing 7TL = 0.945 and 
7TS = 0.955. 
The next example assumes a positive flotation cost c = 0.001. As shown in 
Table 2, at 7TL = TTS — Pavg = 0.95, long debt yields a higher value than does 
short debt for both Bad and Good firms (AVB = 0.193, AVG = 0.003), givena 
positive flotation cost c. Thus, both firms would prefer long debt. The response 
of Good firms is different from the case with c = 0 (see Table 1) because 
flotation costs make short-term debt financing more costly. The existence of 
flotation costs allows investors to increase the difference between 7rL and 7TS 
to reach the separating equilibrium. For c = 0.001, investors can minimize the 
absolute misinformation value by choosing 7TL = 0.94 and 7ts = 0.96. 
It can be shown that an additional increase in flotation costs will further 
reduce the misinformation value. At a certain level of flotation costs, the perfect 
revealing separating equilibrium may emerge. This case is illustrated in Table 3 
Table 2. Numerical Example 2 (c = 0.001, pG = 0.97, p B = 0.93, 
and6> =0.5). 
nL ns p* AVB AVC V™8 
0.95 0.95 0.9706 0.193 0.003 0.152 
0.949 0.951 0.9678 0.176 -0.011 0.145 
0.948 0.952 0.9649 0.158 -0.024 0.138 
0.947 0.953 0.9618 0.141 -0.038 0.131 
0.946 0.954 0.9585 0.123 -0.052 0.125 
0.945 0.955 0.9549 0.105 -0.066 0.117 
0.944 0.956 0.9512 0.087 -0.080 0.110 
0.943 0.957 0.9471 0.068 -0.095 0.103 
0.942 0.958 0.9428 0.050 -0.110 0.096 
0.941 0.959 0.9382 0.031 -0.125 0.088 
0.94 0.96 0.9332 0.012 -0.140 0.081 
0.939 0.961 0.9279 -0.007 -0.155 0.073 
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contrary to previous studies, we show that a separating equilibrium can still be 
achieved when the flotation cost is below this level, or even becomes zero. The 
separating equilibrium may not be able to eliminate the misinformation value 
entirely, but its magnitude is always smaller than that in a pooling equilibrium. 
5. Conclusions 
In a market where rational investors are active participants in the signaling 
game, their pricing strategy leads to a separating equilibrium of debts with 
different maturity arrangements in the absence of flotation costs. The interaction 
of borrowers' incentives and investors' inferences about firm quality results in 
an informational equilibrium under a much more general condition. Firms 
can effectively signal their true quality to the market even if financial market 
transactions are costless. Unlike previous studies, we show that a firm's debt-
maturity structure can provide a credible signal in the absence of transaction 
costs. 
Information asymmetry can create a rather complex maturity structure. Our 
analysis can be easily generalized to the case of multiple maturity structure. In 
equilibrium, higher-quality firms issue shorter-term debt, resulting in a peck-
ing order of debt financing. Firms of the highest quality issue short-term debt, 
and firms of the lowest quality issue long-term debt or serial debt. Firms of 
intermediate quality issue debts of intermediate maturity. Thus, bond ratings 
should be related to the effective bond maturity ceteris paribus. Moreover, to 
the extent that industries are characterized by different degrees of information 
asymmetry, there should be cross-sectional variations in debt-maturity struc-
ture. Industries with higher information asymmetry will tend to use short-term 
debt. Conversely, industries with lower information asymmetry would be more 
likely to follow the asset-liability matching principle to determine the maturity 
structure of debt (see Demirgiic-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Emery, 2001). 
Appendix A 
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1 
Setting the criterion function for the firm's debt financing decision to be zero, 
(1 — P)(2 — 7TT )TTT + (2 — p — (2 — 7Ti )7Ti )7ts 
AV = p- — ^-±— L 5: LJ LJ *
 = o ( A 1 ) 
(2 — Tt^Tt^JTs 
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and solving for p, we can obtain the cutoff quality of firm (p*): 
*
 n * ( 2 - ^L)^L - 7TS[2 - (2 - 7TL)7TL] P =0, p = , (A.2) 
( 2 - 7TL)7TL - JTs 
where p* = 0 represents the case that the firm would go bankrupt for certain, 
and so it should be ruled out. The coexistence of short and long debts requires 
that 
0 < p* < 1. (A.3) 
Imposing the condition in Equation (A.3) on Equation (A.2), we have 
(2-jtL)nL 
0 < JTs < — . (A.4) 
2 - (2 - TCL)7TL 
By definition, 
7tL < 7TS. (A.5) 
Combining Equations (A.4) and (A.5) gives 
0 < 7TL < 7tS < . (A.6) 
2 - (2 - 7tL)TrL 
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2 
Assume c > 0, and set the criterion function for the firm's debt decision to be 
zero: 
(1 — p)(2 — 7rL)7TL + (2 — n — (2 — 7Ti )7TT )7Ts 
AV = p - — L ; + C = 0. (A.7) 
(2 - 7rL)7TL^S 
Solving for p, we can obtain the cutoff quality of firms: 
P* = 0, 
P* = 
(2 - 7TL)jTL - 7TS[2 - (2 - 7IL)JTL] 
2 [ ( 2 - 7 T L ) ^ L - TS] 
V[ffS(2 - (2 - ^ L ) J T L ) - (2 - JTL)7TL]2 + 4GTTS(2 - ;rL)7rL[(2 - TTL^L - ^sl 
2 [ ( 2 - 7 T L ) ^ L - JTS] 
(A.8) 
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Again, the case of p* = 0 is discarded. Imposing the condition in 
Equation (A.3) on Equation (A.8), we have 
2(2 - 7TL)TTL 
- . „ , , — ^—5; < 7TS < (2 - 7tL)7TL. (A.9) 
3 - 2(1 - G)TTL + (1 - G)nl 
By definition, 
7rL<^S - (A. 10) 
Combining Equations (A.9) and (A. 10) gives 
0 < 7TL < 7TS < (2 - 7TL)7rL. (A. l l ) 
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